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This submission describes the impact of recent developments in intergovernmental 
financial relations in Australia before assessing the sustainability `and impact of 
existing State financial arrangements. It concludes with a discussion of options for 
reforming inter-governmental financial relations and Australian federalism more 
generally. It argues that while revitalising the Council of Australia Governments 
(COAG) and fostering a more cooperative brand of federalism may deliver some short 
term dividends, Australian federalism will remain prone to conflict and accountability 
problems as long as the States remain financially dependent on the Commonwealth. 
The submission assesses the financial position of the Australia States before 
examining reform options which would improve the vertical fiscal balance, the root 
cause of intergovernmental conflict in the Australian federation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗ The views expressed in this submission are those of the author and not those of the University of 
Tasmania. 
 
Introduction 
 
Few would dispute that a more cooperative, negotiated style of federalism has the 
potential to deliver significant dividends, but this submission argues that 
intergovernmental relations in Australia will remain prone to conflict as long as the 
States are financially dependent on the Commonwealth. Given this premise the paper 
examines the extent of the vertical fiscal imbalance in the Australian federation and 
whether the States have access to (and responsibilities for) sufficient revenues to 
deliver the services and infrastructure for which they are constitutionally responsible.  
Whilst the goal of improving the vertical fiscal balance in the Australian federation is 
laudable, it poses a range of related questions including: What functions should State 
governments perform in the Australian Federation? What level of funding is required 
to finance these tasks and should States be able to determine how such revenues are 
raised and if granted such fiscal autonomy how should State tax systems be structured? 
Having provided an overview of recent developments in intergovernmental financial 
relations, the submission evaluates some options for reforming fiscal federalism as 
well as assessing their political prospects. 
 
The financial state of the States 
 
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the 1998 A New Tax System (or ANTS) package 
was the fact that the all of the GST revenue was to be allocated to the States in lieu of 
existing Revenue Replacement Grants (introduced after the 1997 Ha Case), general 
Financial Assistance Grants and a host of other indirect State taxes. Beyond securing 
State support the GST, the subsequent intergovernmental agreement (IGA) promised 
to put State finances on a more secure footing. This point made by the then Treasurer 
Peter Costello when he predicted that ‘The GST will provide the States and Territories 
with a secure source of revenue that grows as the economy grows to secure funding 
for essential services, such as schools, hospitals and roads’ (as Quoted in Hamill 2006, 
126).  
 
The key question is whether the IGA has in fact put State public finances on a more 
secure footing and whether the fiscal dividend from the GST is likely to adequately 
meet the future financing needs of State Governments? 
 
Some observations in relation to the IGA: 
• Delivered strong (not spectacular) revenue growth over the period 2000-07 of 
8.9% (nominal) per year. 
• But this growth has not been as strong as in other key Commonwealth taxes 
(CIT and even PIT), especially over the period 2004-2007. This highlights the 
fact that the Commonwealth controls all of the efficient growth taxes in the 
Australian federation. 
• Most of the political debate has focused on the distribution of the GST revenue 
via the Grants Commission, especially surrounding the 2004 ‘Method Review’ 
report and subsequent revisions to the distribution formula. 
• Clearly the national tax system is more efficient as a result of eliminating the 
various taxes and duties specified in the IGA. 
 
 
 
Some less obvious issues: 
• The GST clearly remains a Commonwealth tax, collected by the 
Commonwealth under the auspices of Commonwealth legislation. Indeed it 
can be argued that Commonwealth actually used this control to appropriate a 
portion of the GST windfall by phasing out balancing payments to the two 
years ahead of schedule. 
• The IGA has decreased the fiscal capacity of the States by further reducing the 
number of own-source taxes available to them. In 1999 40% of State revenue 
was from own-source taxes, by 2006 this figure is 33%. In Tasmania this 
figure is 20%.  
• The IGA has increased the relative importance to the CGC process, hence the 
growing debate around the distribution formula and HFE process. 
• The IGA has not reduced the level of Special Purpose Payments to the States 
and therefore has done little to address the VFI and associated accountability 
issues. 
 
State Finances in the 21st century 
 
Any analysis of the sustainability State public finances must consider three factors; 
projected levels of Commonwealth transfers, The State’s own-source revenue base 
and likely expenditure pressures.  
 
This submission has already argued that IGA has delivered significant revenue growth 
to the States which, when combined with very favourable economic conditions, has 
resulted in a significant improvement in State public finances. However, its much less 
clear whether the revenue delivered under the IGA will be sufficient to meet likely 
expenditure pressures confronting States governments, especially given the narrow 
and volatile nature of their remaining own-source taxes. 
 
State Taxes in the 21st century 
 
The most significant forms of State revenues are derived from taxes on payrolls (26%), 
property transactions (21%), land (7%) and gambling (10%). While this revenue base 
grew by 35% in nominal terms of the period 2000-07, this reasonable growth belies 
the volatile (in terms of yield) and inefficient nature of State taxation.  
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Table 1. Key trends in state taxation 2000-06. (Source: ABS 2007). 
 
As outlined in Table 1, the majority of revenue growth (55%) over the period was 
derived from the $6.37 billion per annum increase in property taxes over the period. 
The problem for State public finances is that this property tax windfall was the 
dividend of an unsustainable housing boom, a reality borne out by the fact that such 
revenues have declined in real terms since 2003-04 as realestate prices have stabilised 
and the volume of property transactions has fallen.  
 
Narrowly based taxes are inevitably inefficient and volatile with periods of 
exceptional revenue growth, such as the States experienced during the early years of 
the decade, being punctuated with significant periods of stagnating or declining 
revenues. While State governments managed to achieve cash surpluses (and retire 
state debt) during the early years of the decade, in more recent times State Treasurers 
are once again trying to devise politically palatable ways of expanding their tax base 
as well as other sources of revenue.  
 
Expenditure pressures:  
 
While it is not possible to provide a comprehensive assessment of the expenditure 
pressures confronting the various State governments a brief examination of the recent 
data on the funding of public hospitals highlights the structural fiscal pressures the 
States confront.  
The administration and funding of Australian healthcare is complex with the both 
Commonwealth and States making various (and notoriously variable) contributions. 
This hybrid funding model has attracted growing criticism on a number of fronts in 
recent years and the resulting governance problems have been well documented 
(AMA 2007, National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission 2008). While both 
levels of government fund Australia’s public hospital system a significant trend in 
recent years, which has been identified by the Australian Insitutute for Health and 
Welfare, is that the States are assuming greater responsibility for funding Australia’s 
public hospital system – and yet the States have the least capacity to pay. 
This trend is particularly significant given that health care costs are growing faster 
than either GDP or tax revenue across the developed world. In the case of Australian 
public hospital system, total funding has increased at 12% per annum in nominal 
terms in the decade to 2005-06 (AIHW 2007). This is despite the fact that there has 
been increased utilisation of the private hospital system and despite growing 
recognition that even this level of funding is grossly inadequate (AMA 2007). In short, 
the States have been shouldering a greater share of the public hospital funding burden, 
a share which will have to increase significantly in order to improve the quality of key 
health services. 
In absolute terms State governments have increased public hospital funding by 
between $1 and $1.6 billion per annum over the past three years (AIHW 2007, 55). 
Beyond this, State Governments have argued that they require an additional $1.5 
billion per annum to adequately fund the public hospital system (Queensland 
Government 2007). While this only represents one of the funding pressures 
confronting State governments, the growing revenue needs of public hospitals alone 
consumed 90% of the GST growth dividend in the most recent year for which data is 
available.1 Given the fact that the growth in Hospital funding is outstripping GST 
revenue growth by 3% per annum it seems inevitable that despite the IGA the public 
finances of State Governments are going to come under increasing pressure. 
 
 
Figure 1. Funding sources for Australian Public Hospitals (Current Prices) 1995-96 to 2005-
05. Source AIHW (2007, 55). Note: The upper line representing ‘Australian Government’ 
funding is inclusive of specific Australian Healthcare Agreement (AHCA) funding. 
Reforming federalism: Issues and objectives 
Political debates concerning the constitutional division of power in a federation will 
be familiar to Committee members as they are both fundamentally contested and age 
old. As a consequence it is important to preface any discussion of ‘reforming’ 
federalism with a clear overview of any implicit assumptions and values. The hope 
here is to avoid a flawed deductive logic in which conclusions naturally follow on 
from an arbitrary (or at lease contestable) set of presumptions in relation to whether 
political power should be concentrated or dispersed in a federal system. 
While there are empirical and normative arguments for and against fiscal 
decentralisation/centralisation, the reform options described below are largely 
informed by the view that in the interests of economic and administrative efficiency 
that key income and consumption taxes on mobile factors of production or assets 
should be administered by the national government. However this is not to say that 
States need to necessarily relinquish their capacity set their own tax rates and/or retain 
the capacity to make autonomous policy decisions. Indeed a number of compromises 
                                                 
1 Between 2004-05 and 2005-06 GST revenue growth to the States was $1.83 billion. Over the same 
period additional State funding to public hospitals was $1.63 billion). 
are possible which can enhance the efficiency of the national tax system while 
preserving key aspects of the federalism ideal.  
A pragmatic compromise adopted in many federal states, such as Canada and 
Germany is for sub-national governments to share the most significant tax bases (such 
as personal income tax) with national governments. In practice this involves shared 
taxes being levied on a common base and administered by the national government, 
but with regional governments being able to determine the surcharge they require. 
Another compromise is to raise key taxes centrally and then redistribute revenue to 
the States so that retain control of spending decisions. A final option is for the 
Commonwealth, given its superior budgetary capacity, to fund the most expensive 
public services but to develop a governance model which promotes local management 
and control. In summary, the analysis which follows explores options which enhance 
the consistency and efficiency of the national tax system while reducing Australia’s 
extreme VFI because on this issue there is a reasonably long standing consensus in the 
public finance literature that achieving a vertical fiscal balance is desirable because it 
avoids the uncertainty, dependency and accountability problems which result when 
one level of government in a federal system relies on transfers from another 
(Musgrave 1983). 
On the issue of preserving the sovereign power of the State the analysis is more 
agnostic, but acknowledges that preserving the political power and independence of 
the States is desirable to the extent that it does not undermine the integrity of national 
tax system taken as a whole. 
 
Options for Reform 
Expanding the State revenue base 
The IGA has left the States with a small and relatively fragmented tax base. Whereas 
in 1999-00 the States raised 40% of revenues with their own taxes, in recent years this 
has fallen to 30%. In the federation’s poorest States (who benefit most from fiscal 
equalisation), such as Tasmania, only about 20% of expenditure is funded through 
own sources taxation. Given this narrow revenue base there is clearly limited scope to 
expand State taxation without incurring major economic, social or political costs. 
 Fig 2. Structure of state taxation 2004-05. (Source: ABS 2007) 
Figure 2 illustrates that the States are increasingly reliant on payroll, property and 
gambling taxes, yet there are real political and economic constraints on expanding any 
of these tax bases. We have already noted that the end of the property has reduced the 
prospects of achieving significant growth from this tax base, but the resulting political 
concerns about housing affordability mean that it will be very difficult for State 
governments to raise property taxes. Indeed a number of public and independent 
inquiries have highlighted (not to mention the federal government) the need to reduce 
State property taxes and charges in order to improve housing affordability 
(Productivity Commission 2004). 
Form a public finance perspective payroll taxes represent the most efficient and 
reliable source of State revenue. and, as such, represent the best tax policy option if 
the State’s were to expand their revenue base (Crowe 1999). The Australian reality 
however is not quite as appealing because all of the States impose their payroll taxes 
at different rates and on various tax bases.  When combined with the fact that it is 
difficult to exempt exporters (as with a GST) payroll taxes can result in significant 
distortions and inefficiencies (see Warren 2004, 255). Even more compelling is that in 
his latest review of the impact of taxes on economic behaviour, eminent US tax 
scholar Joel Slemrod concluded that payroll taxes were one of the few taxes which 
had a detrimental effect on economic growth and welfare (Slemrod 2006). When 
combined with the fact that Australian business and employer groups have generally 
been successful in portraying State payroll taxes a taxes on jobs, its not surprising that 
there is little enthusiasm for exploiting this tax base more fully. 
Finally State governments are becoming increasingly reluctant to increase their 
dependence on gaming revenue amid growing concerns about the social impact of 
gambling. It also appears likely that the 2007 federal election may represent the high 
watermark for gaming taxation in Australia. Federally recently elected Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd has also expressed a desire to ‘help wean the states of poker machines’, 
an agenda which will become a priority for the Labor Government if the high profile 
South Australian ‘no-pokies’ campaigner Nick Xenophon manages to influence the 
balance of power in the Senate. Given this context it seems inevitable that the federal 
government will try to limit the expansion of the gaming industry. 
Increased Specific Purpose Payments to the States 
The constitutional division of taxing powers in the Australian federation combined 
with the political and economic constraints describe above mean that it is extremely 
unlikely the Australian States will be able to expand their own-source tax base 
sufficiently to meet future expenditure needs. The most likely response to these 
funding pressures will be a steady increase in tied Commonwealth assistance to the 
States.  
This approach is central to the Rudd Government’s new federalism agenda which 
aims to create a culture of intense collaboration between the Commonwealth and State 
Labor governments (Kelly 2007).2 While it appears that Rudd is genuinely committed 
to grant the States the independence to choose the means by which they achieve 
efficiencies and other policy goals, it seems quite clear that Commonwealth is less 
willing to negotiate when it comes to establishing the goals of intergovernmental 
reforms. For example, in terms of the Hospital Reform Plan it is quite clear that if the 
States fail to achieve agreed targets then the Commonwealth will give consideration 
to a federal takeover of public hospitals. While the Rudd Government may have the 
skill and commitment to negotiate significant intergovernmental reforms, history 
indicates that there are real limits to partisan loyalties and it is likely there will be 
serious political conflicts between State Labor Premiers and the federal Labor 
Government (Hamill 2006, 172-73).  
Ultimately cooperative federalism can only work when the States and the 
Commonwealth have similar interests and when these interests differ the nature of the 
VFI in the Australian federation and the system of tied funding it which yields will 
inevitably result in cost shifting, accountability problems and intergovernmental 
conflict. Given these structural problems with Australian federalism more 
fundamental reforms may be necessary. 
 
Radical reform options 
 
The GST has provided solid revenue growth to the States since 2000, yet the analysis 
provided above indicates that the GST has failed to avert a deepening of the VFI 
afflicting the Australian federation in the face of the increasing expenditure pressures 
confronting State governments. If we accept that the VFI is the structural cause of 
much of the duplication, cost shifting and accountability problems which have 
plagued Australian federalism in recent decades then serious consideration needs to be 
given to reform proposals aim to address this imbalance. The following paragraphs 
will briefly sketch some proposals designed to realign taxing powers and spending 
responsibilities in the Australian federation. 
                                                 
2 Prime Minister Rudd’s first meeting with the Premiers in December 2007 established 
intergovernmental working groups for health, productivity, climate change and water, infrastructure, 
business competition, housing and indigenous affairs. (Metherell 2007). 
 
Increasing the GST? 
 
Perhaps the most logical and efficient proposal to reduce federal financial control over 
the States is to increase the existing GST to a level which would replace all existing 
Commonwealth Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs). Such a policy would potentially 
deliver a number of benefits. Firstly there are a number of international precedents for 
increasing the rate at which consumption taxes are levied in response to evolving 
fiscal, economic and political challenges (Eccleston 2007, ch2.). More importantly, 
such a reform would provide the states with the financial resources to provide public 
services for which they are constitutionally responsible without interference from the 
Commonwealth and in so doing would help restore political accountability within 
Australian federalism. 
 
To what level would the GST have to be raised to fund the elimination of SPPs to the 
States? Based on table 2, which outlines the main sources of state revenue for 2005-06, 
an additional $24.8 billion in GST revenue would be required to compensate the for 
SPPs foregone. Assuming that the increased GST is levied on the existing base and 
the increased rate has a negligible impact on consumption, a  GST rate of the order of 
16-18% would be required, a rate similar to that currently imposed in the United 
Kingdom (17.5%) and lower than that employed in most EU member states. 
 
 
 
Composition of State Revenue 2005-
2006 
 
Total State Revenue $142.0 billion 
Own Source Tax Revenue $44.2 billion 
GST Revenue $38.9 billion 
Special Purpose Payments $24.8 billion 
Other Revenue Source $34.1 billion 
 
Table 2. Composition of State Revenue 2005-06. (Source: ABS 2007)  
 
Clearly increasing the GST rate to eliminate SPPs to the States will have a number of  
political and economic consequences. Firstly it should be noted that increasing the 
GST will increase aggregate taxation in the absence of any offsetting tax cuts with the 
Commonwealth benefiting to the extent of the $24.8 billion which would have 
otherwise been paid to the States. While some of this windfall would be used to 
provide compensation to adversely affected groups, such as those on fixed incomes, it 
would be possible to return a significant a significant proportion of this revenue to the 
two the States via the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC) in return for States 
eliminating some of the least efficient taxes along the lines of the original IGA. For 
example, based on 2005-06 figures the States could be allocated $16 billion for 
agreeing to eliminate payroll taxes ($13.1 billion) and gambling taxes ($2.8 billion) 
still leaving $8.4 billion for the Commonwealth to spend on appropriate compensation.  
 
While such a reform proposal would improve economic efficiency as well as help 
restore accountability in Australia’s federal system it clearly raises a number of 
political issues and may exacerbate some of the problems associated with the CGC 
process. First and foremost any move to increase the GST rate will attract significant 
political resistance as consumers are confronted with higher prices and welfare groups 
and those on fixed incomes highlight the distributional impact of changing the tax mix 
in favour of consumption. Given the political passions which the tax has historically 
evoked in Australia it is likely that political resistance to any proposal to increase the 
GST rate would be even more intense. This is especially so given long held concerns 
that the Howard Government’s 10% GST would be increased subsequent to its 
introduction, concerns that have given rise to periodic bipartisan commitments never 
to increase the GST.  
 
The taboo nature of the GST was also highlighted during the 2007 federal election 
campaign when the then Treasurer Peter Costello attempted to convince voters that a 
federal Labor government and would conspire with State Labor governments to 
increase the GST rate. In the heat of the election campaign this drew a quick 
commitment from Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd that ‘under no circumstances will 
there be any increase to the GST, not over my dead body.’ (Coorey 2007), a 
commitment which the Prime Minister reaffirmed after the 2020 Summit despite 
calling for a ‘root and branch’ review of the national tax system. So while there is a 
both a clear case and a growing political movement to reform Australia’s federal 
system, given the controversy and political baggage associated with the GST it seems 
unlikely that Rudd Government will give serious consideration to altering the GST 
rate.  
 
Sharing other Commonwealth revenue bases 
 
A less politically controversial alternative to increasing the GST would be to give the 
States access to a fixed percentage of existing Commonwealth taxes in lieu of existing 
SPPs. Such a proposal would give the States with greater financial independence and 
should not effect the net revenue positions of either State or Commonwealth 
Governments. Such a revenue sharing compromise is becoming increasingly common 
in federal systems given the growing consensus that major income taxes are best 
administered at a federal level (Norregaard 1997). For example, both Switzerland and 
Germany redistribute a fixed portion of  their personal income taxes to sub-national 
government, while in Canada there have been recent moves to ensure that concurrent 
federal and provincial income taxes are levied on the same tax base in order to 
achieve administrative and compliance savings (Braun 2003).  
 
Interestingly there are Australian precedents for this type of revenue sharing. As part 
of its ‘new federalism’ agenda in 1976 the Fraser Government’s committed to provide 
33.6% of Personal Income Tax revenue to the States as the basis for General Purpose 
Grants (GPGs) (Parliamentary Library 1976). This regime was finally abandoned in 
1985-86 in part because of the Fraser then Hawke Government’s concern that the 
formula was too generous. 
 
This revenue sharing system may have been flawed in that it focused on the quantum 
of GPGs and because it could, unlike the IGA, be unilaterally amended by the 
Commonwealth, but it nonetheless has significant potential to improve both the 
financial security and political independence of the States. What is less well known is 
that the 1978 the Fraser Government went further and passed the The Income Tax 
(Arrangements with the States) Act which gave the States the authority to impose an 
income tax surcharge on Commonwealth income tax should they require additional 
revenue. Alternatively State Governments could offer income tax rebates (Hamill 
2006, 100). Predictably, in the absence of the Commonwealth creating sufficient ‘tax 
room’, no State governments took advantage of the legislation over the decade when 
it was on the statute books. 
 
Despite this chequered history there is no reason why the issue of tax sharing could 
not be revisited as part of a review of fiscal federalism. For example, in 2005-06 the 
Commonwealth raised $118.7 billion in personal income taxation (including FBT) so 
it would be relatively straight forward to replace existing SPPs to the States with a 
commitment to distribute 21% of personal income tax revenue to the States via the 
CGS. Despite the potential benefits the central argument against either increasing the 
GST or formulating a revenue sharing regime is that it would devolve more financial 
and political independence to the States in an era in which both sides of federal 
politics, policy experts and business groups are all calling for increased centralization 
and coordination of regulation and service delivery. Given this context a different 
solution to some of the challenges confronting Australian federalism is to address the 
VFI by increasing centralisation through the reallocation of responsibility for service 
provision  to the Commonwealth.  
 
Transferring Public Hospitals 
 
We have already identified both the cost pressures and complex intergovernmental 
funding issues surrounding Australia’s public health system. Given this situation it’s 
not surprising that recent proposals to reform health services have focused clearly on 
health funding. Perhaps the most significant and interesting of these is the Rudd 
Government’s National Health and Hospitals Reform Plan. While the plan aims to 
achieve a negotiated approach to improving the performance of Australia’s public 
hospitals, with a $2 billion Public Hospitals Reform Fund, the Federal Labor party has 
also expressed an intention to initiate a process whereby the Commonwealth would 
assume control of Australia’s 750 public hospitals if the States had not implemented 
the Reform Plan and achieved some (as yet unspecified) progress towards achieving 
the Plan’s goals.3 A central question is how much would such a transfer cost the 
Commonwealth and how would it impact on intergovernmental financial relations in 
Australia? 
 
According to the most recent Australian Institute for Health and Welfare report into 
Health Expenditure (2007, 55) in 2005-06 total public spending on public hospitals 
was $22.4 billion of which the Commonwealth contributed $10.1 billion (under the 
National Healthcare Agreement and other SPPs) with the States contributing $12.3 
billion. If a Commonwealth takeover were to occur the federal government could 
justify reducing transfers to the States by the full $22.4 billion because at present the 
Commonwealth’s $10.1 billion in National Healthcare Agreement Payments are 
classified as SPPs. Indeed if the Commonwealth were to assume responsibility for 
public hospitals then the States could almost afford to relinquish all of their SPPs 
which amounted to $24.8 billion for 2005-06.  
 
                                                 
3 It must be noted that away from heat of the election campaign the federal Health Minister, Nicola 
Roxon has been talking down the likelihood of the Commonwealth assuming control of public 
Hospitals (Alexander 2008). 
Table 3. Net financial implications of Public Hospital Transfers (based on 2005/06 AIHW Data) 
 
 Commonwealth  + $14.7 billion (Savings through cancellation of SPP to States) 
    - $12.3 billion (Assuming the State’s share of PH funding) 
 
 Net impact  + $2.4 billion (in favour of the Commonwealth) 
 
While there is clearly an initial shortfall $2.4 billion for 2005-06 it is important to 
note that the cost of running public hospital is rising more rapidly than either revenue 
growth or other expenditure pressures, so it is likely that if a review of public hospital 
funding were to be considered in 2009 relinquishing SPP in return for the 
Commonwealth taking control of public Hospitals would be finically viable. Indeed in 
the longer term as hospital costs increase as a percentage of national economic output 
the States could be major financial beneficiaries of such a transfer (Productivity 
Commission 2005). So while centralised control of public hospitals would clearly 
offend the principle of subsidiarity and its normative commitment to decentralisation, 
in other important respects such a proposal has considerable merit. It would improve 
Australia’s VFI and would eliminate the traditional cost and blame shifting between 
federal and States governments associated with Australia’s public hospital system. 
Moreover, if the States agreed to relinquish SPP as part of the transfer then it would 
enhance their political and financial independence over those areas where they 
retained jurisdiction. Most significantly of all it seems that of all the reform proposal 
sketched above the transfer of responsibility for the management and funding of 
public hospitals to the States is the most politically feasible because given the political 
controversies and ever increasing cost associated with Australia’s public hospital 
system the States may be willing to relinquish this responsibility. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper provided an aggregate assessment of State public finances in the context of 
recent political and economic developments. It concludes that while GST revenues to 
the States have increased at a rate of 8.9% per annum in nominal terms over the 
period, a combination of the parlous condition of the State’s remaining own source 
taxes and the rapidly increasing expenditure pressures, mean that the States are under 
increasing financial pressure. Given this situation the second half of the submission 
briefly assessed some proposals to reform Australian fiscal federalism. The 
distributional nature of taxation is such that any proposal to reallocate taxing and 
spending powers is bound to encounter political resistance and for this reason it is 
unlikely that reforms designed to increase the GST or give the States access to 
percentage of Commonwealth revenues are unlikely gain significant political support. 
Yet on the other hand incremental reforms such as increasing existing State taxes or 
Commonwealth SPPs to the States will simply perpetuate many of the structural 
problems which presently afflict intergovernmental relations in Australia. Perhaps the 
most promising reform option assessed in this paper is the Rudd Government’s 
proposal to assume financial responsibility for and management of Australia’s 750 
public hospitals. This proposal has three clear advantages. Firstly it would resolve the 
myriad of cost shifting and accountability problems which have afflicted federal-state 
relations in the area of health policy. Second it would help restore the fiscal balance in 
the Australian federation by assigning the area of fastest public expenditure growth to 
the level of government with the greatest fiscal capacity. Finally, at a political level, 
the health reform agenda seems to be gathering momentum and there is a growing 
willingness to among State and Federal governments to consider radical reform 
proposals such as transferring responsibility for public hospitals to the 
Commonwealth.  
References 
ABS (2007) Taxation Revenue 2005-06 (5506.0). Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra. 
AIHW (2007) Health Expenditure Australia 2005-06. Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, Canberra. http://www.aihw.gov.au/publications/index.cfm/title/10529 
Alexander, C. (2008) ‘Health System and ‘Renovator’s Dream’ The Australian. 8/5/2008. 
AMA (2007) Public Hospitals Report Card. Australian Medical Association. 
http://www.ama.com.au/web.nsf/ 
Braun, D. (2003) Fiscal Policies in Federal States. Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Coorey, P. (2007) ‘Rudd forced to delay GST changes’ Sydney Morning Herald. 25/10/2007. 
Crowe, M., (1999) The Case for Pay-roll Tax, NSW Treasury Research Paper TRP 99-3. 
Eccleston, R. (2007) Taxing Reforms: The politics of the consumption tax in Japan, the 
United States, Canada and Australia. Edward Elgar, Cheltnam. 
Hamill, D. (2006) The Impact of the New Tax System on Australian Federalism. The 
Australian Tax Research Foundation, Sydney.  
Kelly, P. (2007) ‘The Rudd Agenda’, The Australian. 22/12/2007.  
Metherell, M. (2007) ‘Federalism: the sleeper awaits.’ The Sydney Morning  Herald.  
21/12/2007.  
Musgrave, R.A. 1983. ‘Who Should Tax, Where, and What?’ in Tax Assignment in 
Federal Countries, Charles E. McLure, Jr. Editor, Washington DC. 
National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission (2008) ‘Beyond the Blame Game: 
Accountabilityand Performance Benchmarks for the next Australian Health Care 
Agreements’ http://www.nhhrc.org.au/ 
Norregaard, J. (1997) ‘Tax Assignment’ in Fiscal-Federalism in Theory and Practice. IMF 
Washington. 
Parliamentary Library of Australia (1976) States (Personal Income Tax Sharing) Bill 1976. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/1976/1976bd027.pdf>  
Productivity Commission (2004) First Home Ownership. Productivity Commission, 
Melbourne. http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/housing/docs/finalreport 
Queensland Government (2007) State and Territory Concerns in Relation to the AHCA.  
http://www.health.qld.gov.au/publications/aust_hlth_care_agreement/ 
Slemrod, J. (2006) Behavioral Public Finance, edited, with Edward McCaffery (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2006). 
Warren, N. (2004) Tax Reform Facts and Fiction. Australian Tax Research Foundation, 
Sydney. 
 
Biographical Note: 
 
Dr Richard Eccleston holds a PhD in political science from the University of 
Queensland. He is the author of four books and over 20 chapters and articles on 
various aspects of taxation policy, Australian politics and international business 
regulation. At present he is working on a major project on the evolving role of the 
OECD in international tax regulation. In 2007 he returned to his native Tasmania to 
take up a Senior Lectureship in the School of Government at the University of 
Tasmania.  
 
